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Abstract
We consider the online problem in which an intermediary trades identical items with a
sequence of n buyers and n sellers, each of unit demand. We assume that the values of
the traders are selected by an adversary and the sequence is randomly permuted. We give
competitive algorithms for two objectives: welfare and gain-from-trade.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of facilitating trade between n buyers and n sellers that arrive online.
We consider one of the simplest settings in which each trader, buyer or seller, is interested in
trading a single item, and all items are identical. Each trader has a value for the item; a seller
will sell to any price higher than its value and a buyer will buy for any price lower than its
value. Upon encountering a trader, the online algorithm makes an irrevocable price offer, the
trader reveals its value and, if the value is at the correct side of the offered price the item is
traded. After buying an item from a seller, the online algorithm can store it indefinitely to sell
it to later buyers. Of course, the online algorithm can only sell to a buyer if it has at least one
item at the time of the encounter.
We consider online algorithms that offer prices based on the sequence of past values and
we assume that the online algorithm knows only the number of buyers and sellers, but not
their values. The values of the sellers and buyers are selected adversarially and are randomly
permuted. In that respect, the problem is a generalization of the well-known secretary problem.
The secretary problem corresponds to the special case in which there are only buyers, the
algorithm starts with a single item, and the objective is to maximize the total welfare, which is
to give the value to a buyer with as high value as possible.
Extending this to both sellers and buyers, creates a substantially richer setting. One of the
most important differences between the two settings is that besides the objective of maximizing
the total welfare, we now have the objective of maximizing the gain-from-trade. For both
objectives, the algorithm must buy from sellers with low values and sell to buyers with high
values. The objective is that at the end, the items end up at the hands of the traders, sellers or
buyers, with the highest values. The welfare of a solution is defined as the value of the buyers
and sellers that have an item. The gain-from-trade of a solution is the difference between the
welfare at the end of the process minus the welfare at the beginning. At optimality the two
objectives are interchangeable: an algorithm achieves the maximum welfare if and only if it
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achieves the maximum gain-from-trade. But for approximate solutions, the two objectives are
entirely different, with the gain-from-trade being the most demanding one.
The Bayesian version of the problem, in which the values of the buyers and sellers are
drawn from known probability distributions has been extensively considered in the literature.
Optimal mechanisms for bilateral trading, that is, the offline case of a single seller and a single
buyer, were first analysed by Myerson and Satterthwaite in [17] and played a pivotal role in the
development of the area. The online Bayesian case was considered in [9], where the values are
drawn from a known distribution but the sequence is adversarially ordered.
A generalization of our model is when the items are not identical and each buyer has different
value for each one of them, i.e., each seller has a value for its item and each buyer has a vector
of values, one for every pair buyer-seller. This is also a generalization of the well-studied online
maximum-matching problem [14, 12]. One can cast the online maximum-matching problem as
the version in which the sellers arrive first and have zero value for their item. The optimal online
algorithm for this problem has competitive ratio 1/e, when the objective is the welfare (which
in the absense of seller values is identical to the gain-from-trade). Our model is incomparable to
the online maximum-matching problem: it is simpler in the sense that the items are identical (a
single value for each buyer instead of a vector of buyer-item values), and at the same time more
complicated in that the items are not present throughout the process, but they are brought to
the market by sellers that have their own utility. The fact that in our model the buyer-item
values are related, allows for a much better competitive ratio regarding the welfare, (almost) 1
instead of 1/e. More importantly, our algorithm is truthful, while in contrast, no good truthful
algorithm is known for the online maximum-matching problem, which remains one of the main
open problems of the area. On the other hand, the introduction of sellers poses new challenges,
especially with respect to the objective of the gain-from-trade.
There are also similarities between our model and the extension of the classical secretary
problem to k secretaries. From an influential result by Kleinberg [13] we know that this problem
has competitive ratio 1 − 1/√k which is asymptotically tight, and can be transformed into a
truthful algorithm. This result depends strongly on the knowledge of k. In our case the equiva-
lent measure, the number of trades is not known from the beginning and has to be learned, with
a degree of precision that is crucial, especially for the gain-from-trade objective. The fact that
the gain-from-trade is not monotone as a function of time highlights the qualitative difference
between the two models; the gain-from-trade temporarily decreases when the algorithm buys
an item, with the risk of having a negative gain at the end. More generally, with the mix of
buyers and sellers, wrong decisions are penalized more harshly and the monotone structure of
the problem is disrupted.
1.1 Our results
We consider the case when both the number of buyers and the number of sellers is n. For
welfare we show a competitive ratio of 1− O˜(n−1/3), where O˜ hides logarithmic factors.
Actually we can compare an online algorithm with two offline benchmarks: the optimal
benchmark, in which all trades between buyers and sellers are possible, independently of their
order of appearance, and the expected sequential optimal in which an item can be transferred
from a seller to a buyer only if the seller precedes the buyer in the order.
Our online algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1−O˜(n−1/3) against the optimal bench-
mark. To achieve this, it has a small sampling phase of length O˜(n2/3) to estimate the median
of the values of all traders, and then uses it as a price for the remaining traders. But if the
optimal number of trades is small, such a scheme will fail to achieve competitive ratio almost
one, because with constant probability there will not have enough items to sell to buyers with
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high value. To deal with this risk, the algorithm not only samples values at the beginning but it
additionally buys sufficiently many items, O˜(n2/3), from the first sellers1. The number O˜(n2/3)
of bought items balances the potential loss of the welfare that results from removing items from
sellers to the expected loss from not having enough items for buyers of high values.
The term O(n−1/3) in the competitive ratio seems to be optimal for a scheme that fixes
the price after the sampling phase and relates to the number of items needed to approximate
the median to a good degree. It may be possible to improve this term to O(n−1/2) by a more
adaptive scheme, as in the case of the k-secretary problem [13]. Finally, it may be possible to
remove the logarithmic factors from the competitive ratio, but we have opted for simplicity and
completeness.
For the objective of gain-from-trade, we give a truthful algorithm that has a constant com-
petitive ratio, assuming that the algorithm starts with an item. The competitive ratio is high,
approximately 103, but it drops to a small constant when the optimal number of trades is suffi-
ciently high. The additional assumption of starting with an item is necessary, because without
it, no online algorithm can achieve a bounded competitive ratio.
The main difficulty of designing an online algorithm for gain-from-trade is that even a single
item that is left unsold at the end has dramatic effects on the gain-from-trade. The online
algorithm must deal with the case of many traders, large welfare, but few optimal trades and
small gain-from-trade.
To address this problem, our algorithm, unlike the case of welfare, has a large sampling
phase. It uses this phase to estimate the number of optimal trades and two prices for trading
with buyers and sellers. If the expected number of optimal trades is high, the algorithm uses
the two prices for trading with the remaining traders. But if the number is small, it runs the
secretary algorithm with the item that it starts with.
The analysis needs high concentration bounds on the expected number of trades to minimize
the risk of having items left unsold. Our algorithm is ordinal, in the sense that it uses only the
order statistics of the values not the actual values themselves. This leaves little space for errors
and it may be possible that cardinal algorithms that use the actual values can do substantially
better.
1.2 Related Work
The bilateral trade literature was initiated by Myerson and Satterthwaite in their seminal paper
[17]. They investigated the case of a single seller-buyer pair and proved their famous impos-
sibility result: there exists no truthful, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism
that also maximizes the welfare (and consequently, the gain from trade). Subsequent research
studied how well these two objectives can be approximated by relaxing these conditions. Blum-
rosen and Mizrahi [2] devised a 1/e-approximate, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism
for the gain from trade assuming the buyer’s valuation is monotone hazard rate. Brustle et
al. expanded in this direction in [3] for arbitrary valuations and downwards closed feasibility
constraints over the allocations. In the case where there are multiple, unit demand, buyers
and sellers, McAfee provided a weakly budget balanced, 1 − 1/k approximate mechanism for
the gain from trade in [15], where k is the number of trades in the optimal allocation. This
was later extended to be strongly budget balanced by Segal-Halevi et al. in [18]. McAfee also
proved a simple 2-approximation to the gain from trade if the buyer’s median valuation is above
1Buying from the first sellers cannot be done truthfully unless the algorithm knows an upper bound on their
value. But this is not necessary since there is an alternative that has minor effects on the competitive ratio: the
algorithm offers each seller the maximum value of the sellers so far. This is a truthful scheme that buys from all
but a logarithmic number of sellers, in expectation.
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the seller’s [16]. This was significantly improved by Colini-Baldeschi et al. in [?] to 1/r and
O(log(1/r)), where r is the probability that the buyer’s valuation for the item is higher than
the seller’s. Recently, Giannakopoulos et al. [9] studied an online variant of this setting where
buyers and sellers are revealed sequentially by an adversary and have known prior distributions
on the value of the items.
The random order model we are using has its origins in the well-known secretary problem,
where n items arrive in online fashion and our goal is to maximize the probability of selecting
the most valuable, without knowing their values in advance. The matroid secretary problem
was introduced by Babaioff et al. [1]. In this setting, we are allowed to select more than item,
provided our final selection satisfies matroid constraints. A variety of different matroids have
been studied, with many recent results presented by Dinitz in [6]. Of particular interest to
our problem are secretary problems on bipartite graphs. Here, the left hand side vertices of
the graph are fixed and the right hand side vertices (along with their incident) edges appear
online. The selected edges must form a (incomplete) matching and the goal is to maximize
the sum of their weights. Babaioff et al. in [1] provided a 4d-competitive algorithm for the
transversal matroid with bounded left degree d, which is a special case of the online bipartite
matching where all edges connected to the same left hand side vertex have equal value. This
was later improved to 16 by Dimitrov and Plaxton [5]. The case where all edges have unrelated
weights was first considered by Korula and Pal in [14] who designed a 8-competitive algorithm,
which was later improved to the optimal 1/e by Kesselheim et al. [12]. Another secretary
variant which is close to our work is when the online selects k items instead of one, where
Kleinberg [13] showed an asymptotically tight algorithm with competitive ratio 1−O(√1/k).
The wide range of applications of secretary models (and the related prophet inequalities)
have led to the design of posted price mechanisms, that are simple to describe, robust, truthful
and achieve surprisingly good approximation ratios. Hajiaghayi et al. introduced prophet
inequality techniques in online auction in [11]. The k-choice secretary described above was then
studied in [10] which combined with [13] yielded an asympotically optimal, truthful mechanism.
For more general auction settings, posted-price mechanisms have been used by Chawla et al.
in [4] for unit demand agents and expanded by Feldman et al. in [8] for combinatorial auctions
and [7] for online budgeted settings.
2 Model and Notation
The setting of the random intermediation problem consists of sets B = {b1, . . . , bn} and S =
{s1, . . . , sn} containing the valuations of the buyers and sellers. For convenience, we assume
that they are all distinct. The intermediary interacts with a uniformly random permutation σ
of B ∪S which is presented to him one agent at a time, over 2n steps. The intermediary has no
knowledge of σ(t) before step t. We use bi and sj to denote the i-th highest valued seller and
j-th lowest valued seller respectively.
We study posted price mechanisms that upon seeing the identity of agent t offer price pt. This
price can not depend on the entire valuation function; only the values within σ(1) . . . σ(t − 1)
which are revealed at this point. We buy or sell one item from sellers or buyers who accept our
price, respectively. Of course, we can only sell items if we have stock available. Formally, let κt
be the number of items at time t. Starting with κ0 items (with κ0 = 0 for welfare and 1 for the
gain-from-trade):
κt+1 =

κt + 1, if σ(t) ∈ S ∧ σ(t) ≤ pt
κt − 1, if σ(t) ∈ B ∧ κt ≥ 1 ∧ σ(t) ≥ pt
κt otherwise.
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The set of sellers from whom we bought items during the algorithm’s execution is
TS = {s ∈ S | ∃t σ(t) = s ≤ pt }
and similarly the set of buyers we sold to is TB = {b ∈ B | ∃t σ(t) = b ≥ pt ∧ κt > 0}. Notice
that these are random variables, depending on σ.
The social welfare of online algorithm A is the sum of the valuations of all agents with
items. In particular, after executing A it is: WA(S,B) = E
[∑
s∈S\TS s+
∑
b∈TB b
]
. The gain
from trade (or GFT) produced by algorithm A throughout the run is the difference between
the final and starting welfare: GFTA(S,B) = E
[∑
b∈TB b−
∑
s∈TS s
]
.
We are interested in the competitive ratio of our online algorithm A compared to the offline
algorithm OPT . In this setting there are two different offline algorithms to compare against:
optimal offline and sequential offline. They both know S,B, but the first can always achieve
the maximum welfare, whereas the second operates under the same constrains as we, namely
he can only perform trades permitted by σ, which is unknown. We say that algorithm A is
ρ-competitive for welfare (or gain from trade) if for any B,S we have:
WA(B,S) ≥ ρ · WOPT(S,B)− α, (1)
for some fixed α ≥ 0.
Often we will refer to the matching between a set of buyers and a set of sellers. Let
M(S,B) = {{S1} ∪ {B1}}, where S1 ⊆ S,B1 ⊆ B is the set of sellers and buyers with whom
we trade (or are matched, in the sense that the items move from sellers to buyers) in a wel-
fare maximising allocation and m(S,B) the optimal gain from trade. Note that this does
not contain pairs: only the set of each side of the matching. Similarly, let M(S,B, q, p) be
the matching generated by only trading with sellers valued below q and buyers above p. In
a slight abuse of notation, we will use |M(S,B)| = |S1| for the size of the matching and
M(S,B) ?M(S′, B′) = {{S1 ? S′1} ∪ {B1 ? B′1}}, where ? is any set operation. For convenience,
we refer to M(σ) =M({s | s ∈ σ} , {b | b ∈ σ} where σ is a sequence of agents.
3 Welfare
In order to approximate the welfare, the online algorithm uses a sampling phase to find the
median price, in an attempt to transfer items from agents below the median to more valuable
ones above it. The two main challenges, in terms of its performance, are estimating the median
with a small sample and not missing too many trades due to the online nature of the input.
Before we delve into the actual algorithm, it is useful to state two probability concentration
results, similar to the familiar Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, but for the setting where sampling
happens without replacement as is our case.
Lemma 1. Let X = {x1, . . . , xN} where xi ∈ {0, 1}, x1 = x2 = . . . = xm = 1 and xm+1 =
. . . = xN = 0 for some integer m ≥ 0. Consider sampling n values of X uniformly at random
without replacement and let Xi be the value of the i− th draw. For Y =∑ni=1Xi, we have that
for any  > 0:
Pr[Y ≥ (1 + )E [Y ]] ≤ e−22max{m,n}mnN2 (2)
and
Pr[Y ≤ (1− )E [Y ]] ≤ e−22max{m,n}mnN2 . (3)
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Proof. Let Yi = E [Y |X1, . . . , Xi] be the Doob martingale of Y , exposing the choices of the first
i draws. Clearly we have that |Yi+1 − Yi| ≤ 1, since the knowledge of one draw cannot change
the expectation by more than 1. Applying Azuma’s inequality, we obtain:
Pr[Yn − Y0 ≥ t] ≤ e
−t2
n . (4)
Let Zj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m indicate if xj was chosen. Since only these xj contribute to Y , we
have that Y =∑mi=1 Zi. Repeating the previous martingale construction, we get:
Pr[Ym − Y0 ≥ t] ≤ e
−t2
m . (5)
But, we know that Y0 = E [Y ] = E [
∑m
i=1 Zi] = m nN . Setting t = m
n
N in both (4) and (5)
and using Yn = Ym = Y we obtain:
Pr[Y ≥ (1 + )E [Y ]] ≤ e−22max{m,n}mnN2 . (6)
Concentration in the opposite direction is found by repeating the same analysis, using the
complementary form of Azuma’s inequality.
Note that this result is not superfluous: by immediately applying Hoeffding’s inequality for
sampling with replacement, we would obtain:
Pr[Y ≥ (1 + )E [Y ]] ≤ e−22m
2n
N2 ,
which is only tight if m is large compared to N . The concentration should intuitively work if n
is a large fraction of N as well: imagine n = N .
Similarly, we often encounter a situation where we are interested in the number of trades
between n sellers and n buyers, arriving in a uniformly random permutation. Assuming we buy
from all sellers, occasionally we would encounter a buyer without having any items at hand.
This results shows that even though this is the case, few trades are lost.
Lemma 2. The number of trades M(σ), where σ is a uniformly random sequence containing
n buyers and n sellers, is:
E [M(σ)] ≥ n− 1
n
(
n−√2n logn) , (7)
assuming all sellers are valued below all buyers.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since we buy from all sellers and attempt to sell to all buyers, let Xt be 1
if at step t a seller is encountered and −1 if it is a buyer. We define the following martingale,
with Y0 = 0:
Yt+1 =

Yt +Xt if Yt > 0
Yt −Xt if Yt < 0{
1 with probability 12
−1 with probability 12
if Xt = 1 and Yt = 0
Yt otherwise
.
Basically, Yt keeps track of the unsold items: sellers pull away from 0 and buyers towards 0.
We need to define Yt since Xt is not a martingale: E [Xt|Xt−1 = 0] > 0. Inductively, it is easy
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to show that |Yt| = Xt. Therefore, the number, of unsold items at time t is at most |Yt|. By a
simple case analysis we have that |Yt+1 − Yt| < 1. Thus, by Azuma’s inequality we have:
Pr[|Y2n − Y0| ≥
√
2n logn] ≤ e−2 4n logn2·2n = 1
n
. (8)
Since n items are bought, we have:
E [M(σ)] ≥ n− 1
n
(
n−√2n logn) (9)
All the machinery is now in place analyse sequential algorithms in this setting. We first
show a key property of the offline algorithm.
Proposition 1. The optimal offline algorithm sets a price p, equal to the median of all the
agents’ valuations and trades items from sellers valued below p to buyers valued above p.
Proof. Since there are only n items available, if we could freely redistribute the items we would
choose the top n agents with highest valuations. Let p be the value of the n-th most valuable
agent. If there are k buyers valued above p we have n − k buyers and k sellers valued below
it. Thus, buying from all sellers below p and selling to all buyers above it is an optimal
algorithm.
However, the optimal sequential offline algorithm would not just trade at this price. For
instance, if there is 1 buyer and n−1 sellers above p and 1 seller and n−1 buyers below, trading at
this price would give a 1/2 probability of transferring the item, since only one transfer increases
the welfare and the agents have to appear in the right order. Therefore, if that buyer has a
much larger valuation than anyone else, this algorithm would only be 1/2-competitive. However,
we can modify this approach with a bias towards buying more items than needed, in order to
maximise the probability of finding high valued buyers.
Lemma 3. The optimal sequential online algorithm is
(
1−O
(
logn
n1/3
))
-competitive against the
optimal offline for welfare.
Proof. The optimal online algorithm adjusts the price p according to the following two cases,
where M = |M(S,B)|.
1. M ≥ n2/3. In this case the same price p is used. At the end, the online algorithm will
still keep the highest valued n−M sellers and by Lemma 2 will match
M − 1
M
(
M −√2M logM)
buyers in expectation. The offline optimum will of course keep the highest n−M sellers
and M buyers, leading to a competitive ratio of at most:
M − 1
M
(
1−
√
2 logM√
M
)
= 1−O
( logn
n1/3
)
.
2. M < n2/3.
In this case, suppose two prices are used: pS to buy from the lowest n2/3 sellers and pB
to sell to the highest n2/3 buyers. For the buyers, the online does at least as well as
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the previous case. In particular, it it obtains a uniformly random sample of size at least
n2/3−
√
2n2/3 logn2/3 by Lemma 2, amongst the top n2/3 buyers with probability at least
(n2/3 − 1)/n2/3. Since the M buyers matched by the optimal offline are contained within
the highest n2/3 buyers, the ratio just from buyers remains the same as before.
From the sellers side, the online keeps the highest n− n2/3 sellers, while the offline keeps
at most n, for a ratio at most 1− 1/n1/3.
Combining both cases, the ratio is asymptotically at most:
1−O
( logn
n1/3
)
. (10)
Note that the choice of n2/3 to separate the two cases is optimal.
The next step is to design an online algorithm without knowing p or |M(S,B)| beforehand.
The algorithm is as follows:
1. Record the first 8n2/3 logn agents and calculate their median p′. Buy from all sellers
during this sampling phase.
2. After the sampling starts the trading phase:
(a) Buy from seller s if s ≤ p′.
(b) Sell to buyer b is an item is available and b ≥ p′.
For the analysis of this algorithm, we first need a concentration result on the sample median p′.
Lemma 4. Let X = {1, . . . , 2n} and select 8n2/3 logn elements from X without replacement.
Then, their sample median M satisfies:
Pr[|M − n| ≥ n2/3] ≤ O
( 1
n
)
. (11)
Proof. We have that:
Pr[M ≥ n+ n2/3] = Pr[more than 4n2/3 logn elements picked no less than n+ n2/3]
Since we are sampling without replacement, this is equivalent to selecting 8n2/3 logn elements
uniformly at random from X ′ containing n + n2/3 0’s and n − n2/3 1’s and having their sum
be greater than 4n2/3 logn. Using X ′,  = n2/3/(n − n2/3) and taking 8n2/3 logn samples in
Lemma 1, we have:
Pr[M ≥ n+ n2/3] = Pr[Y ≥ (1 + )E [Y ]] = Pr[Y ≥ n2/3]
≤ exp
−2( n2/3
(n− n2/3)
)2
(n− n2/3)8n
2/3 logn(n− n2/3)
4n2

≤ O
( 1
n
)
.
By symmetry, the same holds for Pr[M ≤ n−n2/3]: just reverse the ordering of the agents.
This shows that our sample median p′ might have at most n2/3 agents more on one side
compared to the true median p. However, this loss is negligible asymptotically, as these agents
are a uniformly random subset of the S ∪B. We now show that buying from sellers during the
sampling phase, before considering any buyers, can only increase the number of trades in the
next phase.
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Lemma 5. Let σ be a sequence containing n buyers and n sellers. Move an arbitrary seller the
beginning of the sequence to obtain sσ′. Then we have:
|M(sσ′)| ≥ |M(σ)|.
Proof. Let b′ be the first buyer not to receive an item in σ. Clearly, if b′ doesn’t exist then the
number of items sold in both cases is n. Assume we sell the item bough from s only if it is the
last item left. Then, it is sold to b′: otherwise b′ would not be the first buyer not to be sold an
item is σ. There are two cases:
1. If s appears in σ before b′: both sequences continue identically as we have no items in
stock after b′.
2. If s appears after b′ in σ: there is one fewer seller in sσ′ after b′, since s was moved to the
front. However, this can result in at one lost sale.
Actually, we have shown that moving sellers to the beginning can only increase trades, which
is slightly more powerful. We are now ready to state one of the main results of this section.
Theorem 1. This algorithm is
(
1− O˜
(
1
n1/3
))
-competitive for welfare.
Proof. As before, let M = |M(S,B)| be the size of the optimal offline matching. The following
analysis assumes that the event of Lemma 4 did not occur and p and p′ split the agents in two
sets, differing by at most n2/3. Given this, we analyse the algorithm in three steps. First show
that we never buy too many items from highly valued sellers, therefore we keep most of the
sellers’ contribution to the final welfare. Then we show that we always match a high proportion
of the valuable buyers by considering two cases: if there are few such buyers then they are
matched to the sellers we obtained during the sampling phase, otherwise we have enough sellers
below p′ to match them to.
We introduce some notation useful to the analysis: let W be the set containing the top
n−n2/3 highest valued agents. Then let SW , BW be the number of sellers and buyers respectively
in W and S′W , B′W be how many of them appeared after the sampling phase. valued agents. To
show the competitiveness of our algorithm, it suffices to find the fraction of W that is achieved
at the end of the sequence: being (1− O˜(1/n1/3))-competitive against the top n− n2/3 agents
implies a ratio of (
1− O˜(1/n1/3)
)
· n− n
2/3
n
= 1− O˜(1/n2/3)
against all n agents above the median and therefore the optimal offline.
We first show that we never lose too much welfare by buying from sellers, both in
the sampling and trading phase. Given p′, the only occasion on which a seller in W is
bought is if he is amongst the first 8n2/3 logn sellers. This event is clearly independent from
the condition on p′, meaning in expectation we keep
E
[
S′W
]
= SW
(
1− 8n
2/3 logn
n
)
= SW
(
1− 8 logn
n1/3
)
(12)
highly valued sellers. Therefore, enough of the sellers’ original value is kept. The rest of the
analysis will only focus only the proportion of buyers in W who get an item. For the number
of items IS bought during the sampling phase, the following holds by Lemma 1:
Pr
[
IS ≤ (1− 12)4n
2/3 logn
]
≤ e−2 148n2/3 logn n
2
4n2 ≤ e−n2/3 , (13)
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as there are n out of 2n agents are sellers and we sample 8n2/3 logn of them. Therefore, we
enter the trading phase with an excess of at least 2n2/3 logn items with high probability.
To analyse the number of buyers in W matched, we consider two cases.
BW ≤ n2/3 logn: In this case there are few valuable buyers and all we need to show is
that the excess of items bought during sampling is enough to trade with most of them. We
first need to find E [B′W ], which is slightly more complicated, since we have conditioned on p′
approximating the median. Given p′, at least 4n2/3 logn agents were above the median value
during the sampling phase. Note that all of the agents in W are above the median. Therefore,
any of the agents in the upper 4n2/3 logn half of the sampling phase could be replaced by a
buyer in W . At worst, 4n2/3 logn agents from W are in the sampling phase, which means that
in a random permutation, we have:
n2/3 logn ≥ E [B′W ] ≥ BW
(
1− 4n
2/3 logn
n− n2/3
)
.
We might also consider up to n2/3 extra buyers, if p′ underestimated p. However, given that
IS ≥ 2n2/3 logn with high probability, every buyer in B′W will be matched with an item, giving
the claimed competitive ratio for this case.
BW > n
2/3 logn: Let k ≥ BW be the number of trades the optimal offline algorithm would
perform. Since the median might be underestimated, the number of sellers we consider is at
least k − n2/3 and buyers at most k + n2/3. We show that, with the help of the extra items we
bought during sampling, we have more items than buyers in total, with high probability. Let
Sp′ , Bp′ the number of sellers and buyers below and above p′ after the sampling phase. By by
Lemma 1 we expect to find
Pr[Sp′ ≤ (1−
√
log k
k
)(k − n2/3)2n− 8n
2/3 logn
2n ] (14)
≤ exp
(
−2log k
k
(k − n2/3)(2n− 8n
2/3 logn)2
4n2
)
≤ O
(1
k
)
, (15)
by sampling 2n− 8n2/3 logn out of 2n with k − n2/3 important elements. Similarly we have
Pr[Bp′ ≥ (1 +
√
log k
k
)(k + n2/3)2n− 8n
2/3 logn
2n ] ≤ O
(1
k
)
. (16)
It is important to note that these quantities are almost equal, other than a n2/3 factor which is
insignificant compared to k. Then, with high probability (well O(1/k), relatively high):
Bp′ − Sp′ ≤ (1 +
√
log k
k
)(k + n2/3)− (1−
√
log k
k
)(k − n2/3) (17)
≤ 2(√k log k + n2/3) (18)
≤ 3(√n logn), (19)
given than k ≤ n. Since we bought at least 2n2/3 logn items during the sampling phase, the
total number of items bought is higher than the total number of buyers considered for n large
enough. Also, by Lemma 5 having these items ready before encounter buyers is beneficial.
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Therefore, we get a lower bound on the number of buyers in Bp′ that actually acquire an
item using Lemma 2. The number of items sold in expectation is at least:
M≥ Bp′ − 1
Bp′
(
Bp′ −
√
2Bp′ logBp′
)
. (20)
However, we are interested only in the fraction of buyers in BW who acquired an item. The
algorithm does not differentiate between any buyer above p′, the sequence is uniformly random
and all buyers in BW are contained within the top k+n2/3 buyers. By lower bounding Bp′ with
Lemma 1:
Pr[Bp′ ≤ (1−
√
log k
k
)(k + n2/3)2n− 2n
2/3 logn
2n ] ≤ O
(1
k
)
, (21)
and using (20), the fraction of buyers in BW matched is at least:
M
k + n2/3
≥ 1− O˜
( 1
n2/3
)
, (22)
with probability 1−O(1/k), which is asymptotically high as k ≥ n2/3 logn.
4 Gain from Trade
Compared to the welfare, the gain from trade is a more challenging objective. The main reason
is that even for large n, the actual trades that maximise the GFT can be very few and quite
well hidden. Moreover, buying from a single seller and being unable to sell could completely
shatter the GFT, while it could have very little effect on the welfare.
First of all, the setting has to be slightly changed. We give the online algorithm one extra,
free item at the beginning to ensure that at least one buyer can acquire an item, even when the
initial sampling has been inconclusive. For fairness, the offline algorithm is also provided with
this starting item. We show that this modification is absolutely necessary to study this setting
under competitive analysis.
Theorem 2. Starting with no items, there exist S,B such that the competitive ratio for the
GFT is arbitrarily high.
Proof. Consider two different valuations. The first has s1 = c > 0 and b1 = c+ . In the second
has sˆ1 = c, bˆ1 = c − , sˆ2 < bˆ1 − ′. We tweak the value of the buyer so that the trade from
instance one no longer increases welfare, but add one extra seller to keep the optimal GFT
positive.
Let p = Pr[s1 ∈ TS | σ−1(b1) > σ−1(s1)] be the probability of the online algorithm buying
from s1, conditioned on b1 arriving later. This must be p > 0, otherwise his expected gain from
trade will be 0, compared to the /2 generated by the offline.
However, in the second instance the algorithm should buy from sˆ2 instead of sˆ1. But, if sˆ1
appears first, the first algorithm should buy from him too, as the information received so far is
the same:
pˆ = Pr[sˆ1 ∈ TS | σ−1(bˆ1) > σ−1(sˆ1) ∧ σ−1(sˆ2) > σ−1(sˆ1)]
≥ pPr[σ−1(sˆ2) > σ−1(sˆ1)]
= p2 > 0.
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So the online algorithm has a positive chance of buying the item from the wrong seller. Assuming
in all other cases maximum gain from trade is extracted, we have:
GFTA(S,B) ≤ pˆ(−) + (1− pˆ)(′ − ). (23)
Since pˆ is independent of , ′, we can set
′ = 1− pˆ
which leads to GFTA(S,B) = 0 whereas the offline has /2.
In any case, no online algorithm can perform well in both instances.
To avoid the previous pitfall, we assume the intermediary starts with one item. Roughly, the
algorithms starts by estimating the total volume of trades in an optimal matching by observing
the first segment of the sequence. Using this information, two prices pˆ, qˆ are computed, to be
offered to agents in the second part. This being an ordinal mechanism, the goal is to maximise
the number of trades and leave no item unsold. During the trading phase we are also much
more conservative: at most one item is kept in stock and we stop buying items well before the
end of the sequence, to make sure that there are enough buyers left to sell everything. The
online algorithm A(c, ,N) contains parameters whose values will be specified later.
Input: A sequence σ of length 2n, appearing online.
Output: A matching between buyers and sellers.
With probability 12 ignore sellers and sell the item as in the normal secretary, otherwise
continue ;
Split the sequence into two segments such that σ = σ1σ2, with |σ1| = c · 2n;
Let S1, B1 denote the sellers and buyers of σ1;
Calculate the welfare maximising matching M(S1, B1);
if |M(S1, B1)| ≤ N then
Sell the item to the highest buyer as in the normal secretary problem and stop;
end
Set pˆ, qˆ which only keep (1− ) · c · |M(S1, B1)| many matched pairs;
i← c · 2n;
k ← ∅;
M ← ∅;
/* For the first half of σ2, buy and sell items, keeping at most one in
stock */
while i ≤ c · 2n+ (1− c) · 2n/2 do
if σ(i) is a seller, k = ∅ and σ(i) ≤ qˆ then
k ← σ(i);
end
if σ(i) is a buyer, k 6= ∅ and σ(i) ≥ pˆ then
Sell to σ(i);
k ← ∅;
end
i← i+ 1;
end
For the second half of σ2, just try to sell the last remaining item, if any;
The idea is to use the first part of the sequence to estimate the matching M(S,B). If a
large (in terms of pairs) GFT maximising matching is observed, it is likely that a proportionate
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fraction of it will be contained in the second half. In that case, sellers and buyers are matched
in non overlapping pairs to avoid buying too many items. However, if the observed matching is
too small, then the algorithm defaults to selling only the starting item, as it is very likely that
σ2 will not contain enough buyers for anything more.
Before moving on to the analysis of the algorithm, we need a simple lemma on the structure
of GFT maximising matchings, to explain the prices set.
Lemma 6. For any S,B and S1 ⊆ S,B1 ⊆ B:
1. m(S,B) can be obtained by setting two threshold prices p, q and trading with buyers above
and sellers below them.
2. Choosing pˆ > p and qˆ < q such that |M(S,B, qˆ, pˆ)| ≥ α|M(S,B)| for α < 1 yields
m(S,B, qˆ, pˆ) ≥ αm(S,B).
3. |M(S,B)| ≥ |M(S1, B1)| and m(S,B) ≥ m(S1, B1).
Proof. For Property 1, assume s < b < sˆ < bˆ, such that s, b, sˆ, bˆ ∈M(S,B). But, instead of two
matches we can just match bˆ to s instead: bˆ− s > b− s+ bˆ− sˆ, thus any such pair of matched
agents cannot be part of M(S,B). Setting q = max {s ∈M(S,B)} and p = min {b ∈M(S,B)}
we have q < p and the result follows. This is essentially the same observation as using the
median price to trade, but using two different prices for robustness, as we will see later.
Property 2 follows because M(S,B, qˆ, pˆ) contains the α highest value pairs for M(S,B).
Property 3 is straightforward.
Theorem 3. A(c = 0.3,  = 0.2758, N = 114) is O(1)-competitive for the gain from trade.
Proof. Let z = |M(S,B)|. We bound the gain from trade for the case where σ1, σ2 contain
their analogous proportion of M(S,B) and show that the losses are insignificant otherwise. In
particular, let
f(c, , z)
= Pr
[
M(S,B) ∩M(S1, B1)
M(S,B) ≥ c(1− ) ∧
M(S,B) ∩M(S2, B2)
M(S,B) ≥ (1− c)(1− )
]
be the well mixed probability, where an -approximate chunk of the matching appears in both
parts. The two events are not independent. To bound f(c, , z), it suffices to study the distri-
bution of SM = {s ∈M(S,B)} and BM = {b ∈M(S,B)}, the sets of agents comprising the
optimal matching. By Lemma 6, we know that any seller in SM can be matched to any buyer
in BM . Since we only care about the size of the matching in σ1 and σ2, not its actual value, we
can rewrite f(c, , z) as:
f(c, , z) = Pr
[
|SM ∩ S1|
|SM | ≥ c(1− ) ∧
|BM ∩B1|
|BM | ≥ c(1− )∧ (24)
|SM ∩ S2|
|SM | ≥ (1− c)(1− ) ∧
|BM ∩B2|
|BM | ≥ (1− c)(1− )
]
, (25)
which is easier to handle.
It is useful to think the input as being created in two steps: first the volume of agents in
S1, B1, S2, B2 is chosen and afterwards their exact values are randomly assigned. As such, a
lower bound on the fraction of the size of the online to the offline matching provides the same
bound on the gain from trade. We begin by bounding f(c, , z).
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Lemma 7. The probability the matching is well-mixed is
f(c, , z) ≥ 1− 2(e−22zc2 + e−22z(1−c)2)
Proof. Continuing from (24) we have:
f(c, , z) = Pr
[
|SM ∩ S1|
|SM | ≥ c(1− ) ∧
|BM ∩B1|
|BM | ≥ c(1− )∧
|SM ∩ S2|
|SM | ≥ (1− c)(1− ) ∧
|BM ∩B2|
|BM | ≥ (1− c)(1− )
]
≥ 1− Pr
[ |SM ∩ S1|
|SM | ≤ c(1− )
]
− Pr
[ |BM ∩B1|
|BM | ≤ c(1− )
]
−
Pr
[ |SM ∩ S2|
|SM | ≤ (1− c)(1− )
]
− Pr
[ |BM ∩B2|
|BM | ≤ (1− c)(1− )
]
(26)
≥ 1− 2(e−22zc2 + e−22z(1−c)2), (27)
where (26) follows by taking the complement and a union bound and (27) by applying Lemma 1
individually for each event.
Let p and q be the prices achieving the matching M(S,B), by Lemma 6. We need to show
that the prices pˆ, qˆ computed achieve a constant approximation of m(S2, B2). Since M(S,B) is
well mixed and by using Lemma 6 we have that:
|M(S,B)| ≥ |M(S1, B1)| ≥ |M(S1, B1, q, p)| ≥ (1− ) · c · |M(S,B)|, (28)
where the second inequality holds sinceM(S1, B1) is a gain from trade maximising matching and
the third because at least a (1− ) · c fraction of M(S,B) appeared in σ1. In particular, we have
that M(S1, B1, q, p) ⊆ M(S1, B1) is the highest value part of M(S1, B1) and M(S1, B1, qˆ, pˆ) ⊆
M(S1, B1, q, p), thus qˆ ≤ q and pˆ ≥ p leading to:
|M(S1, B1, qˆ, pˆ)| ≥ (1− )2c2|M(S,B)| (29)
by Eq. (28). Therefore, the prices pˆ, qˆ computed find a relatively large subset of M(S,B). We
now need to find just how many of the trades in M(S2, B2, pˆ, qˆ) are achieved by our algorithm.
Let Sˆ2 = {s | s ∈ S2 ∧ s < qˆ} and Bˆ2 = {b | b ∈ B2 ∧ b > pˆ}. We need a high probability
guarantee on the size of Sˆ2 and Bˆ2.
Lemma 8. Assuming the matching is well mixed:
Pr
[
|Sˆ2| ≥ ((1− c)(1− )− 12)|SM |
]
≥ 1− 2−c2(1−)2|SM |.
Proof. In the well-mixed case, we have that
|S2 ∩ SM | ≥ (1− c)(1− )|SM | and |S1 ∩ SM | ≥ c(1− )|SM | (30)
which leads to
|S1 ∩ SM | ≤ (1− (1− c)(1− ))|SM |. (31)
To get a lower bound on the size, we have:
Pr
[
|Sˆ2| ≥ |SM |2 − |S1 ∩ SM |
]
≥ Pr
[
|Sˆ2| ≥ ((1− c)(1− )− 12)|SM |
]
(32)
≥ Pr [qˆ ≥ median(SM )] (33)
≥ 1− 2−c2(1−)2|SM | (34)
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where Eq. (32) follows from Eq. (30). Eq. (33) follows since if qˆ is greater than the median, then
at worst case all elements from S1 ∩ SM are less than qˆ, which still leaves plenty of sellers in
S2. Eq. (34) follows since draws are not actually independent, but this works in the inequality’s
favour. From Eq. (29) we know qˆ is greater than at least a c2(1− )2 fraction of sellers. Since
the ‘bad case’ is choosing all sellers below the median, this happens with higher probability if
each draw is with rather than without replacement, leading to the result.
Clearly, Lemma 8 holds for buyers as well. The proof is almost identical, keeping in mind that
buyers are ordered the opposite way.
At this point we have a clear indication of how many sellers and buyers the prices pˆ, qˆ cover
in the second part of the sequence. Since this is an ordinal mechanism, we want to maximise
the number of trades provided no item is left unsold. There are no a priori guarantees on the
welfare increase of each trade, even a single unsold item ruins our gain from trade guarantees,
in the worst case.
Lemma 9. Let A = |M(S2, B2, qˆ, pˆ)| and B = |S2| + |B2| − A. Then, the probability that no
item is left unsold is at least 1 − 2−A. Moreover, the expected number of trades in this case is
at least:
A+B/2−1
2A+B−1 · A2 − A2A
1− 2−A ≈
|M(S2, B2, qˆ, pˆ)|
4 . (35)
Proof. We begin by calculating the probability of having an unsold item, which is easy: it is
at most as much as the probability of not encountering a buyer within the last (1 − c) · 2n/2
agents. Using a similar argument as Lemma 8, this probability is at most 2−A.
We now need to calculate the expected number of trades. LetXi be a random variable indicating
that an item was sold to the i-th agent. We have:
Pr [Xi = 1] = Pr [ previous transaction was buying ∧Xi is a buyer ]
= A2A ·
A
2A+B − 1 =
1
2 ·
A
2A+B − 1 ,
since the previous transaction being buying from a seller occurs with probability A2A as there
are A sellers in M(S2, B2, pˆ, qˆ) for 2A total agents and the sequence is shuffled. The second
fraction has 2A + B − 1 for the denominator, taking into account that one seller has already
been used.
By linearity of expectation, the total number of trades X is (note that we only consider the
first half of σ2, where we both buy and sell):
E [X] ≥ E
(2A+B)/2∑
i=2
Xi
 = (A+B/2− 1)E [Xi]
= (A+B/2− 1)12 ·
A
2A+B − 1
= A+B/2− 12A+B − 1 ·
A
2
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We can use this to calculate the expected number of trades in the case where nothing is left
unsold:
E [X|No items unsold] = E [X]− E [X| Unsold items] Pr [Unsold Items]Pr [No unsold items]
≥ E [X]−
A
2−A
1− 2−A
Everything is now in place to provide a lower bound on the gain from trade of the matching
calculated by the algorithm. Assuming z = |M(S,B)|, we can compose Lemma 7, Lemma 8
and Lemma 9 to show that with probability at least
J(c, , z) = f(c, , z) · (1− 2−c2(1−)2z) · (1− 2−((1−c)(1−)− 12 )z), (36)
the matching has size at least
((1− c)(1− )− 12)z
4 . (37)
The matching is not a uniformly random subset of M(S,B), but it is skewed to contain higher
value trades since pˆ > p and qˆ < q. Taking into account that we run a simple secretary algorithm
with probability 1/2 and assuming we lose the highest valued seller s? in our matching when
the agents are not well mixed (we can only have one unsold item) the GFT is at least:
1
2eb
1 + J(c, , z)2 ·
((1− c)(1− )− 12)m(S,B)
4 −
1− J(c, , z)
2 s
? (38)
whereas the offline GFT is at most
m(S,B) + b1. (39)
To upper bound the competitive ratio ρ we analyse three different cases:
1. If z < N :
In this case the algorithm would never detect a sufficiently sized matching and would
always run a simple secretary algorithm. Note this is possible, as c = 0.3 ≤ 1/e required
for the secretary.
ρ ≥
1
eb
1
m(S,B) + b1 ≥
1
e
· b
1
(z + 1)b1 =
1
e(z + 1) (40)
2. If N ≤ z < N 1c(1−) . In the well-mixed case, the online algorithm will not detect a
matching and fall back to secretary. Therefore, the competitive ratio is:
ρ ≥
1
2eb
1 + 12(f(c, , z)
1
eb
1 − (1− f(c, , z))s?
m(S,B) + b1 ≥
1− e+ (1 + e)f(c, , z)
2e(z + 1) . (41)
given that c < 1/e and the sampling phase for the secretary continues.
3. z ≥ N 1c(1−) . Now in the well mixed case a large enough matching is found. We have:
1
2eb
1 − 1−J(c,,z)2 s?
b1
≥ 12e − (1− J(c, , z)), (42)
and
J(c,,z)
2 ·
((1−c)(1−)− 12 )m(S,B)
4
m(S,B) ≥
J(c, , z) · ((1− c)(1− )− 12)m(S,B)
8 . (43)
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Therefore, the competitive ratio is:
ρ ≥
1
2eb
1 + J(c,,z)2 ·
((1−c)(1−)− 12 )m(S,B)
4 − 1−J(c,,z)2 s?
m(S,B) + b1
≥ min
{
1
2e − (1− J(c, , z)),
J(c, , z) · ((1− c)(1− )− 12)m(S,B)
8
}
.
Therefore, c,  and N are selected to maximise the minimum amongst all cases of z, which is
picked by the adversary. Computationally, we find that setting c = 0.3,  = 0.2758 and N = 114
yields ρ ≥ 1/1434.
If we are given that |M(S,B)| will be large, then this algorithm can be adapted to have
greatly improved competitive ratio. In particular, setting c =  = 0.01 achieves ρ ≥ 1/17 as
|M(S,B)| → ∞.
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